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Abstract. This paper addresses the endogenous formation of trade agreements
in a three-country model of imperfect competition. While the requirement of
sustainability of preferential trade areas has often been ignored in the literature,
I construct a framework for predicting which trade agreements form when sus-
tainability is explicitly included as a constraint on the formation of cooperative
agreements. It is found that the introduction of a self-enforcement requirement
reduces the overall scope for cooperative trade agreements, and that preferen-
tial trade areas can be stepping stones or stumbling blocks depending on the
size of relative demand between countries.
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libre comercio en un modelo de competencia imperfecta entre tres pa´ ıses. Te-
niendo en cuenta que la literatura ha ignorado en ocasiones el requisito de
sostenibilidad en las ´ areas de libre comercio, el art´ ıculo propone una estructu-
ra para predecir qu´ e acuerdos comerciales se forman cuando la sostenibilidad
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1. Introduction
Between 1948 and 1994, the GATT received 124 notiﬁcations of regional
trade agreements (RTAs) related to trade in goods. In the ﬁrst seven years after
the creation of the WTO in 1995, the notiﬁcation of more than 130 additional
agreements covering trade in goods and services followed. In 2003, more than
150 RTAs were in force, and the number was expected to rise to around 300 in
2007 if the trend then continued. The vast majority of these agreements are
either customs unions (CUs) or free trade areas (FTAs).1
The proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) implies the pres-
ence of major incentives to enter such agreements. A growing literature tries to
identify these incentives, explain how the formation of PTAs aﬀect welfare of
members as well as non-members, and predict the impact of PTAs on the or-
ganization of the world trading system. This literature can broadly be divided
into two approaches.2 The traditional one follows Viner (1950) and examines
the eﬀect of exogenously speciﬁed PTAs on the welfare of members and non-
members.3 The second, and more recent, approach models the endogenous
formation and stability of PTAs in order to understand how the pattern of
trade agreements can be expected to develop over time. Especially interesting
is the question of whether PTA formation will speed up the process towards
global free trade or end up blocking the process in order to preserve preferential
gains. The stepping stone/ stumbling block idea was introduced by Bhagwati
(1991), and has been the topic of several papers including Ludema (1994),
Bagwell and Staiger (1997a,b), Yi (1996), and Krishna (1998).
This paper emphasizes the latter approach in that it provides a ﬁrst attempt
to predict which trade agreements result when the formation of PTAs (and free
trade) is endogenous and all agreements must be self-sustaining. In particular,
I determine the welfare eﬀects of eight diﬀerent trade agreements (namely the
non-cooperative, 3 FTAs, 3 CUs, and free trade)4 in a three-country model
of imperfect competition and endogenous tariﬀ setting. I use welfare compar-
isons to determine the individual countries’ preferences over trade agreements
and ﬁnd conditions for agreements to be sustainable in a standard inﬁnitely
repeated game framework with Nash punishment. The core solution concept
developed by Riezman (1985) is applied to the model, and the idea expanded to
a dynamic framework in which trade agreements are restricted to those that are
sustainable and therefore will be observed: while Riezman assumes that “some”
mechanism will make the trade agreements of the core binding, I explicitly
1www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/regfac e.htm#top
and www.warwick.ac.uk/˜vxscbl/regionalism.pdf
2Yi (1996) p. 154.
3Contributions include Kemp and Wan (1976), Panagariya and Krishna (2002), and Krug-
man (1991).
4I limit my analysis to these agreements since the vast majority of PTAs in the world
are either FTAs or CUs. Though the inclusion of multilateral tariﬀ reductions would be
desirable, it is beyond the scope of this paper except for a brief discussion in the case of
symmetric countries. With this limitation, PTAs are subsequently taken to refer to CUs and
FTAs only.
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model sustainability in order to make everything endogenous, self-sustainable
and optimal. These requirements reﬂect the facts that countries voluntarily
choose to make a trade agreement, that they cannot prevent other countries
from cooperating, and that real world trade agreements face enforcement prob-
lems which should be dealt with theoretically. An important methodological
contribution of the paper is to introduce the core as an equilibrium selection
tool which helps determine the trade agreement(s) most likely to form among
all self-sustainable agreements.
One example of how self-enforcement cannot be taken for granted is the
Andean Community. It started in 1969 with the signature of the Cartagena
Agreement between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, aiming at
the creation of a CU. Though successful at ﬁrst, problems started in the late
1970’s when members failed to comply with the agreement due to pressure from
domestic interest groups “unhappy with the diﬀerences in short-term costs and
beneﬁts ﬂowing from the integration process”.5 Unresolved disputes along with
the oil crisis worsened the situation, and the Pact was virtually dead until a
fundamental change towards free market-oriented policies was adopted in the
early 1990’s. Since then, integration has enhanced. First with an FTA structure
but then with gradual integration towards a CU.6
Naturally, the failure of the Community in the 1980’s was not only due to
Latin countries being “too impatient”. However, the attempts to start and
later restore the Community do imply an incentive to cooperate which history
tells us did not lead to cooperation. In this way, the example shows that the
sustainability of PTAs should not simply be assumed, and that an incentive to
cooperate does not always equal the ability to do so.
As for multilateral agreements, enforcement has improved signiﬁcantly in
later years through the dispute settlement body of the WTO. But since a
dispute can still take more than one year to settle, countries continue to have
an incentive to cheat to obtain short term gains- and still do cheat as has been
the case with the US recently.
The idea of using core theory to predict which trade agreement form when
countries are free to make agreements endogenously was developed in Riez-
man (1985). He considers a three country- three goods pure exchange economy
where countries diﬀer in endowments only. CUs are seen as coalitions in the
core, and the formation of these modelled in a two stage game. First, a coali-
tion is chosen based on core theory. Second, optimal tariﬀs are chosen given
the coalition. The resulting agreements are stable in the sense that no other
coalition which yields higher welfare to all members of that coalition can form.
It is assumed that there exists a mechanism so that agreements are binding.
This gives a natural interpretation of the core, namely that agreements in the
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Riezman’s idea was subsequently expanded in Krishna (1998), which consid-
ers a three-country oligopolistic trade model with several ﬁrms in each country,
and takes a political economy approach where producer lobbies’ preferences are
determinant for trade policy. It is found that the more trade diverting an FTA
is, the more likely it is to be supported by its members because trade diversion
towards products produced by members move the game from being close to
zero-sum (members gain in their partner’s market but lose in their own) to be-
ing positive sum (members gain more in their partner’s market and lose less at
home at the expense of the third country). It is also found that the more trade
diverting a block is, the more likely it is to be a stumbling block to free trade.
While the above coalition formation games are static, Freund (2000) ex-
pands the model of Krishna (1998) to a dynamic framework to show that
multilateral tariﬀ reductions (which are assumed binding) increase both the
incentive for PTAs and the likelihood that these are sustainable. Sustainabil-
ity for PTAs is, as here, deﬁned in a standard repeated game framework. The
incentive for PTAs is shown to depend on the relative size of two eﬀects: the ef-
ﬁciency eﬀect of free trade- the gains from the increase in competition following
full trade liberalization-, and the redistributive eﬀect of PTAs- the diversion
of proﬁt loss to the outsider country, whose output contracts when the PTA is
formed.
Finally, Yi (1996) studies the stability of CU structures in an N country
model under two diﬀerent rules: “open regionalism” under which coalitions
can form freely provided no outsider is excluded, and “unanimous regionalism”
under which an outsider country can join a CU iﬀ all existing members agree
to this. He ﬁnds that open regionalism supports free trade, while unanimous
regionalism typically supports two CUs of asymmetric size in equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, CUs are stepping stones towards free trade under open regionalism,
but can be stumbling blocks under unanimous regionalism.
These papers all yield interesting results, but what is also evident is that at
least some coalitions, once made, are assumed binding. As noted by Syropoulos
(1999), this approach is customary in the literature. Indeed, Baldwin, in his
infamous (1995) domino-paper does not account for why the open regionalism
rule is applicable. Bagwell and Staiger (1997a,b) argue that enforcement is
important and require multilateral agreements to be sustainable but still let
CUs form exogenously and expand at random. Krugman (1991) considers sym-
metric CUs, but does not account for their sustainability. The present paper
shows that this approach can be misleading in that predictions of which trade
agreements form change signiﬁcantly by the imposition of the sustainability
requirement.
The paper is organized as follows: the static model is presented in section 2
along with the calculation of optimal tariﬀs under all possible trade agreements.
Section 3 introduces the static game and the welfare incentives that drive it,
and determine the trade agreements in the core. Section 4 deﬁnes sustainability
and solves the dynamic game. The stepping stone/ stumbling block issue is
brieﬂy touched upon, and the model is extended to cover multilateral tariﬀs
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when countries are symmetric. Section 5 concludes.
2. The static model
This section outlines the underlying model with optimizing consumers and
producers. The welfare measure is presented, and by optimizing it, optimal tar-
iﬀs are determined for the uncooperative equilibrium as well as for preferential
agreements.
The basic model builds on Krishna (1998) and Freund (2000). It contains
three countries: X, Y , and Z, each with one proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm producing
a homogenous, imperfectly competitive good. Segmented markets character-
ized by Cournot competition lead to trade in this good, with the three proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrms competing in all markets (countries). The good is traded
without transportation costs,7 but possibly subject to an above-zero speciﬁc
import tariﬀ. In consensus with recent negotiations within the WTO, export
subsidies are banned.
The economy furthermore contains a numeraire good which is characterized
by perfect competition and serves to settle the trade balance. No tariﬀ is levied
on this good and transporting it between countries is costless.
Consumers in each country maximize their utility, which is quasilinear in
the two goods:





with ξx and qx denoting consumption in country X of the numeraire and imper-
fectly competitive good respectively. Here, and throughout this and the next
section, country (ﬁrm in, consumers in, etc.) X will be used as an example for
notational ease. Results for Y and Z follow directly by substitution of appro-
priate sub- and superscripts due to the symmetric nature of the model. a and
b are parameters > 0, allowed to be country speciﬁc (therefore the subscript).
Maximizing utility gives a linear inverse demand function for the imperfectly
competitive good:
px(qx) = ax − bxqx (2)
Firms maximize proﬁts taking demand, tariﬀs, the supply of other ﬁrms,
and production costs as given. The latter are constant on the margin (in terms
of the numeraire good), so total costs for the ﬁrm from country X (ﬁrm X
henceforth) are given by Cx = cxqx where cx is the marginal cost of ﬁrm X
(cx < ax), and qx is the total production of that ﬁrm. Along with the assump-
tion of segmented markets, this allows me to treat the proﬁt maximization in
each market separately.8
7As in Krishna (1998), the joint assumption of segmented markets and no transportation
costs on direct export of the imperfectly competitive good can be justiﬁed by assuming that
transportation costs are prohibitively high for any third party trying to make an arbitrage
proﬁt.
8For example, this would not hold had their been economies of scale, because the marginal
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The proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm X in country i (i ∈ (X,Y,Z)
throughout this paper) is then given by:
Max
xi
{πi = xipi(qi) − cxxi − tx
i xi}
s.t. yi; zi; pi(qi) = ai − biqi; qi = xi + yi + zi
(3)
where πi is proﬁt of ﬁrm X in country i; xi,yi,zi is the supply of ﬁrm X,Y,Z
respectively in country i, and tx
i is the tariﬀ levied on imports from ﬁrm X
by country i. Note how tariﬀs simply increase the constant marginal cost of
getting each unit to the market: the eﬀective marginal cost becomes cx + tx
i
instead of cx.
To solve the maximization problem, assume that costs and demands are
related in a way that yields interior solutions only (that is, above zero equilib-
rium quantities and proﬁts). Then solving the maximization problem yields a









(yi + zi) (4)
As expected, supply is increasing in demand
￿




in the cost of production and tariﬀs levied against the product. It is also
decreasing in the supply of other ﬁrms in market i since this lowers the residual
demand curve facing ﬁrm X.
In equilibrium, supply equals demand and there are neither trade deﬁcits
nor surpluses. In this model, equilibrium quantities can be found directly
from solving the nine supply equations (i.e. the 9 equations resulting from (4)
when one considers supply from each country to each country) since prices will
adjust to create demand-supply equalization and the trade balance is settled
automatically due to the presence of the numeraire good: utility is increasing
in ξ, so countries will buy exactly as much ξ from abroad as their trade balance




(3ax − cx − cy − cz − ty
x − tz
x) (5)
which is increasing in country X’s demand and decreasing in eﬀective produc-
tion costs of all ﬁrms because supply is (cf. (4)). The reason why consumption
in X is independent of demand in Y and Z is that each ﬁrm’s supply to country
X is independent of its supply to other markets. On the other hand, all supply
decisions involve considerations of marginal cost, and consumption therefore
cost of export to another country then depends on the exporting ﬁrm’s total production and
thus on the conditions in other markets. Furthermore, the decrease in production costs
following an expansion of output would create an additional incentive for cooperation among
countries which is ignored here.
More generally, any factor that causes interdependency between markets could cause a
link between production/ sales decisions in diﬀerent markets. Dixit (1987) provides some
examples of this.
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depends on the (eﬀective) cost of production in each ﬁrm. The total produc-




























































the production for ﬁrms’ own markets is increasing in the degree of protection
against imports, while exports are decreasing in the tariﬀs levied against the
exporting country but increasing in tariﬀs levied against other import.9 The
intuition of these results should be clear: the more protected a ﬁrm is in a given
market relative to other ﬁrms, the more the ﬁrm will produce for that market.
2.1. Welfare
The welfare criterion used by the government is an equally weighted func-
tion of consumers surplus, producers surplus, and tariﬀ revenue. The equal
weighting may reﬂect either the reduced form of a particular political economy
game, or an abstraction from political economy altogether.10 Tariﬀ revenue is
included in the welfare function as revenue gives the country access to a larger





























9Krishna (1998) reaches a similar result for his model with more than one ﬁrm in each
country.
10Macho-Stadler et al (1998) show how diﬀerent weights in the welfare function can aﬀect
the stability of trade agreements in a similar model.
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with the six lines each corresponding respectively to consumers surplus, pro-
ducers surplus in X,Y and Z, and tariﬀ revenues obtained from X’s imports
from Y and Z.
It is seen that consumers surplus decreases when demand falls and when
production costs or protection rise. This is intuitive since these changes all
reduce the quantity supplied, and this lowers consumer surplus as evident in
Figure 1 below. All proﬁts are increasing in demand and the (eﬀective) cost
advantage of ﬁrm X. Finally, the tariﬀ revenue from Y has a “Laﬀer curve”
eﬀect: an increase in tariﬀs decreases the tax base but increases the per unit
revenue so that revenue is increasing in ty
x for ty
x < 1
6 (ax + cx − 3cy + cz + tz
x),
and decreasing in ty
x otherwise. Tariﬀ revenues from country Z change in a
similar manner.
To get an overview of how the surplus of country X is divided between
countries, consider Figure 1. In the ﬁgure, the downwards sloping curve is the
demand in X, the horizontal axis measures qx, and the vertical axis measures
px. The total gain for country X in its own market is given by consumers
surplus (AEB) + producers surplus (DELK) + tariﬀ revenue from Y (FGNM)
+ tariﬀ revenue from Z (HIJO). This is the area that country X maximizes
when setting its external tariﬀs below. The remaining surplus goes to ﬁrms Y
(area BCGF) and Z (area CDIH) as proﬁts.
2.2. Optimal tariﬀs
Tariﬀs are set by the government of each country to maximize welfare. As
in Riezman (1985), the choice of trade agreement and the setting of optimal
tariﬀs take place in a two stage game. Optimal tariﬀs are set in the second
stage, conditioned on the relevant trade agreement (free trade, FTA, CU, or
Nash). This trade agreement is determined in the ﬁrst stage, with each country
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Figure 1. Division of gains from country X.
seeking to maximize its welfare, taking into account the choice of optimal tariﬀs
in the second stage.
Both the parameters that the government can determine and the welfare
outcome depends on the actual trade agreement. For the home country, in-
creasing an external tariﬀ will cause a decrease in consumers surplus (qx falls),
an increase in producers surplus at home (competition from abroad decreases),
and have an ambiguous eﬀect on the tariﬀ revenue (there is less import, but
each unit of import generates a larger revenue). Producers surplus abroad goes
unaﬀected because of market segmentation.
Governments will set the tariﬀ at the point where the gain from increasing
it any further is exactly matched by the loss of doing so. That is, where the
derivatives of the welfare function with respect to relevant tariﬀs are zero.
While country X is still used as an example, optimal tariﬀs for all countries
can easily be determined by exchanging appropriate sub- and superscripts.
2.2.1. Nash equilibrium tariﬀs
The Nash equilibrium tariﬀs are the tariﬀs of the non-cooperative equilib-
rium. Because countries act individually, they are free to optimize welfare (8)
with respect to two external tariﬀs. For country X, this optimization yields







































(6ax − 2cx + 3cy − 7cz)
(9)
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In the Nash (and also under subsequent trade agreements), optimal tariﬀs of
any one country are independent of the tariﬀs set by other countries. This lack
of strategic interaction results from the assumed lack of interaction between
markets. Had preferences for instance not been quasilinear and income eﬀects
of tariﬀs on the imperfectly competitive good therefore not eﬀectively assumed
away, these eﬀects would cause interdependency in tariﬀ setting across coun-
tries. The lack of strategic interaction is desirable in that it makes the model
tractable. However, it must also be recognized that potentially important ef-
fects are left out of the analysis, and that results should be interpreted with
care. Of course, as is evident from the welfare function (8), the lack of strategic
interaction in tariﬀ setting by no means imply that welfare is also independent
of other countries’ tariﬀs.
The optimal tariﬀs are increasing in ax: when ax increases, country X is
willing to pay a higher price for each quantity (remember px(qx) = ax −bxqx),
and therefore foreign supply rises and more proﬁts go abroad
￿
it can be shown
that the proﬁt of ﬁrm X in country i equals PSi = bi(xi)2￿
. The government
in country X can shift some of these proﬁts back by raising tariﬀs. As it turns
out, a small increase in tariﬀs beneﬁts the home ﬁrm and tariﬀ revenue more
than the resulting drop in foreign supply harms the consumers in X. Thus, it
is optimal to raise external tariﬀs in face of an increase in domestic demand.
Costs aﬀect the optimal tariﬀs for similar reasons. For instance, the larger cy
the smaller is Y ’s market share in X, and the bigger is the competition from
Z’s exports, which calls for a larger tariﬀ towards Z.
2.2.2. FTA tariﬀs
In conformity with the requirements of the GATT Article XXIV, all PTAs
are restricted to have internal free trade. FTAs and CUs are diﬀerentiated by
their external tariﬀ setting: FTAs set their external tariﬀs independently while
CUs set a common external tariﬀ (CET) which maximizes the joint welfare
of members. It is assumed that each member in the PTA obtains all tariﬀ
revenue associated with its consumption. Thus, in an XY -PTA,11 X acquires
the tariﬀ revenue obtained from the import of zx, and Y obtains the tariﬀ
revenue obtained from importing zy. No intercountry transfers are allowed
for.12
Let X form an FTA with Y . Under the above conditions, ty
x is ﬁxed at
zero and X can only maximize its welfare with respect to its tariﬀ against the
























11That is, a PTA between X and Y . Similar notation will be used throughout the paper.
12Kowalzcyk and Sjostrom (1994) show how transfers can be used to facilitate trade nego-
tiations. Riezman (1985) brieﬂy explains one complication that can arise when transfers are
allowed for.
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and equating the derivatives to zero yields Proposition 1:












(3ay + 7cx − cy − 9cz) (11)
The external tariﬀs of the FTA are (normally) below those of the Nash13 due
to what has been named the “tariﬀ complementarity” eﬀect: when a member
country removes the tariﬀ against the partner, imports from the partner expand
while imports from the non-member contract (due to the lack of preferential
status). The latter lowers both consumers surplus and tariﬀ revenue. As noted
by Freund (2000) p. 364, these negative eﬀects on welfare may be reduced by
slightly lowering the tariﬀ against the non-member.
The optimal tariﬀ of X is still increasing in ax and cy while decreasing
in cx and cz for reasons similar to those under the Nash. The non-member
country is free to optimize welfare with respect to its two external tariﬀs and
will therefore set the same tariﬀs as under the Nash.
2.2.3. CU tariﬀs
In a CU, internal trade is free and the CET set by maximization of the joint
welfare of member countries: letting tz
x,y denote the CET of the CU between































Because the eﬀect on the partner’s proﬁts is internalized, the optimal CET is
usually greater than the external tariﬀs of the corresponding FTA:14
Proposition 2. The unique optimal CET of CU-members X and Y is:
tz
x,y =
5(byax + bxay) + (by + bx)(cx + cy − 7cz)
19(by + bx)
(12)
13For country X, the condition for this is 66ax − (22cx + 77cy − 33cz) > 0.
14This is true when
bx (−57ax + 105ay + 40cx − 112cy + 24cz) + by (48ax + 24cz + 40cx − 112cy) > 0.








































The main diﬀerence to the FTA is that the optimal tariﬀ is now increasing in
demand and production cost of both X and Y as a result of the internalization
of eﬀects on the partner’s welfare. Also, the optimal tariﬀ is increasing in bx
and decreasing in by provided ay > ax, and vice versa when ay < ax: if the
intersection of demand in country Y is greater than in X, then a decrease in
demand in X (that is, an increase in bx) calls for more protection.
Even if the CET usually exceeds the external tariﬀ of the FTA, it is also
usually below that of the Nash.15 Thus GATT’s Article XXIV, which restricts
external tariﬀs on a PTA to be no larger than previous external tariﬀs on
average, should not be a binding constraint on the solution.
3. The static game and the core
The static game consists of two stages: trade agreement choice and tariﬀ
setting. This section characterizes the core of the coalitional game under the
assumption that countries cannot in the second stage deviate from the tariﬀ
agreement made in the ﬁrst stage. This is a characterizing feature of the static
game, and an assumption that will be relaxed in the dynamic setting.
In the ﬁrst stage, countries are free to make trade agreements. For an
agreement to result, all members must accept it.16 Furthermore, a country
accepts an agreement only if it cannot form another agreement (alone or with
partner(s)) in which all members in the new agreement yield at least as much
welfare (with at least one strict inequality) as under the old agreement. Thus,
the resulting trade agreements are exactly those that are in the core, as in
Riezman (1985). The advantage of this solution concept is, of course, that all
countries behave optimally and that agreements chosen by welfare maximiza-
tion are more easily enforced than externally determined agreements.
To solve the static game analytically, I proceed in two steps. First, a map-
ping from trade agreement to welfare is constructed using the second stage
15For the XY -CU, this is true provided
(bx + by)(14ax − 58cx + 37cy + 7cz) + 100bx (ax − ay) > 0.
16This corresponds to unanimous regionalism in Yi (1996).
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optimal tariﬀs. This is the aim of the next subsection. Second, I let policy-
makers use this mapping to make trade agreement choices as described above.
In what follows, it will be convenient to number the eight trade agreements
under consideration:
Table 1. Trade agreements.
1. Nash equilibrium
2. FTA between X and Y
3. FTA between X and Z
4. FTA between Y and Z
5. CU between X and Y
6. CU between X and Z
7. CU between Y and Z
8. Free trade
Furthermore, denote the trade agreements γ and the consumption of the nu-
meraire and non-numeraire good in each country under these trade agreements
Tγ: Tγ = {ξx,qx,ξy,qy,ξz,qz} | γ for γ = 1,...,8.
3.1. Welfare revisited
To determine the mapping from trade agreement to welfare for each country,
I simply insert the second stage optimal tariﬀs into the welfare functions (8).
The fact that optimal tariﬀs are unique means that the mapping will be well
deﬁned for all countries and agreements in Table 1.
For tractability, I subsequently assume
ax = ay = az = a and cx = cy = cz = c.





(a − c), tFTA =
1
7




where the interpretation of superscripts should be evident.17 Internalization of
the partner’s welfare causes tariﬀs in a CU to be almost double of those of the





17Freund (2000), p. 364 ﬁnds similar optimal tariﬀs for symmetric countries.
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 9 (1): 61–94, junio de 200674 THE ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF SUSTAINABLE TRADE AGREEMENTS
always, the potential problem of a PTA increasing average external tariﬀs and
thus violating the GATT requirement will not be encountered. Note also that
the simpliﬁcation causes FTA-partners to set the same external tariﬀs even
when they are asymmetric.




















dz + 0 + 0 (13)
where the terms correspond to consumers surplus, producers surplus at home,
producers surplus in Y and Z, and tariﬀ revenue from import from Y and Z
respectively. In this setting, ﬁrms have no advantage in their home market
compared to other ﬁrms (there are no tariﬀs) which is why producer surplus
follows the same formula at home and abroad.





















where the interpretation of terms is as above. As in Brander and Spencer
(1984), pure proﬁts are shifted from foreign ﬁrms to the domestic country in
terms of proﬁts for the domestic ﬁrm and tariﬀ revenue. The cost, of course,
is an anticompetitive eﬀect which causes domestic consumption and thus con-
sumers surplus to fall. Because the two other countries adopt similar beggar-
thy-neighbor policies, export proﬁts decrease. Overall, country X is worse oﬀ
than under free trade unless 45dx > 42(dy + dz). That is, unless country X
has such big demand that gains from rent extraction through tariﬀs overshadow
eﬃciency gains obtainable from free trade.
The welfare achieved under free trade and the Nash serve as comparison
points for welfare obtainable under PTAs. Performing this comparison yields
Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. For all countries and preferential agreements
• A country is better oﬀ in a PTA than under the Nash provided the market
of the partner country is suﬃciently large.
• A country is better oﬀ in a PTA than under free trade provided the joint
market of member countries is suﬃciently large.
• A country prefers to form a PTA with the country that has the largest
market of the two other countries.
• A country is better oﬀ in an FTA than in a CU (with the same partner),
provided the country’s own demand is at least 40
21 times the demand of the
partner country.
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where what constitutes “suﬃciently large” depends on whether the PTA in
question is an FTA or a CU. In what follows, I will go through the welfare
eﬀects of FTAs and CUs. Proposition 3 follows from the discussion.



































where the interpretation of sub- and superscripts should be obvious. It is seen
that overall consumption of the non-numeraire good has decreased and lowered
consumers surplus compared to free trade though the level is still above that of
the Nash. The preferential treatment of ﬁrms operating from within the PTA
causes ﬁrm X’s proﬁts from country Y to increase compared to both the Nash
and free trade. This gain can be decomposed into two separate eﬀects: a direct
eﬀect on proﬁts caused by the drop in eﬀective cost of production (which falls
from c + tx
y to c), and a strategic eﬀect caused by the trade shift of quantities
in favour of ﬁrm X because of its new cost advantage.18
In the home market, the direct eﬀect of PTA formation is always zero.
Compared to the Nash, there is a strategic loss because ﬁrm Y now shares ﬁrm
X’s cost advantage: domestic proﬁts fall. Compared to free trade, there is a
strategic gain since ﬁrm Z loses its tariﬀ-free access to country X: domestic
proﬁts increase. Proﬁts from the third country are as under the Nash since this
country’s tariﬀ against X is independent of the PTA formation. Compared to
the Nash, imports from Z rise under an FTA but falls under a CU. Tariﬀ
revenue falls in both cases because the revenue from each unit decreases.
For country X to gain from PTA membership compared to the Nash,
X must be suﬃciently small compared to Y so that preferential access to
Y ’s market outweighs all losses following the opening of X’s own market
(210dx < 351dy for an FTA, 1890dx < 3239dy for a CU). In the real world, this
for instance has the plausible implication that it is more likely that Canada and
Mexico gain from NAFTA than that the US does. Finally, country X prefers as





iﬀ dy > dz
￿
. This is intuitive as country X is interested in getting preferential
access to the largest market possible19 (due to market segmentation, the cost of
gaining that preferential access is the same no matter which partner is chosen).
For a PTA to be preferred over free trade, it must be the case that in-
creased access to the outsider market does not make up for the loss of prefer-
ential treatment in the partner country; 175dx + 250dy > 686dz for an FTA
18Krishna (1998). Obviously, the direct eﬀect is zero when moving from free trade to a
PTA.
19This is in line with Perroni and Whalley (2000), who argue that the main motive of
small countries entering PTAs is to secure their access to a large market. The result more
generally helps explain why small countries often make concessions to large countries when
entering a PTA.
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and 1125dx + 10750dy > 15162dz for a CU. A large domestic demand is re-
quired because the gains from rent shifting (in form of domestic proﬁts and
tariﬀ revenue) are proportional to domestic demand (so is the loss in consumer
surplus, but this eﬀect is outweighed). The size of the partner’s market is even
more important because this determines the demand to which the domestic
ﬁrm gains preferential access.20
The trade oﬀ oﬀered between a CU and an FTA is one of producer surplus
versus consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenues: the former is larger under the CU
(CU markets are more protected) while the latter are greater under an FTA
for the same reason. Because the eﬀects on producers in the home market are
always outweighed by the eﬀects on consumers and tariﬀ revenues, the size
of the partner’s market becomes determinant for whether an FTA or a CU is
preferred. Formally, domestic demand must be at least 40
21 times the demand
in the partner country for an FTA to be preferred over a CU. However, this is
naturally highly sensitive to the relative weights used in the welfare function.
The previous Proposition shows how countries value PTA membership,
but in order to be able to compare a country’s welfare under all possible agree-
ments in Table 1, it is necessary to also determine the welfare of outsider
countries. This leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 4. A country in the Nash is better oﬀ than outside a CU, but
worse oﬀ than outside an FTA. Furthermore, a country is best oﬀ not making
any cooperative agreement (whether or not the two remaining countries form a
PTA) provided its own market is suﬃciently large.












































to the welfare under the Nash. Again, the interpretation of sub- and super-
scripts should be obvious. The reason why a country is better oﬀ outside
an FTA than in the Nash is that the tariﬀs levied against it decrease while
its domestic market is unaﬀected by the coalition formation. Thus, exports
increase and the outsider country gains. Macho-Stadler et al (1998) ﬁnd a
similar eﬀect in their symmetric model, and describe it as the outsider free
riding on the others- a problem which may be severe enough to prevent multi-
lateral agreements.21 For the CU, the domestic market is still unaﬀected, but
the high CET of the CU causes ﬁrm X to earn less abroad so that country
20Bond et al (2003) reach a similar result for FTAs, though their intuition is that if the size
of FTA-members is large, a larger fraction of trade is internal ex ante, and the FTA suﬀers
less when the rest of the world reacts to its tariﬀ decrease by raising their tariﬀs.
21In Bond et al (2003), the outsider to an FTA gains compared to the Nash because the
FTA’s reduction in external tariﬀs causes terms of trade to rise for the outsider.
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X is unambiguously worse oﬀ than under the Nash. This is true even though








. The fall in tx
y does increase proﬁts abroad, but not
enough to outweigh the adverse eﬀect of ﬁrm Z gaining preferential access to
market Y (tz
y falls to zero).
To prove the last part of Proposition 4, it is necessary to show that the lowest
welfare a country not cooperating with anyone can achieve (i.e. that of a CU-
outsider) exceeds welfare under both PTA membership and free trade provided
domestic demand is suﬃciently large. First, for a CU non-member to be better









required: X must be so large compared to Y that preferential access to market
Y does not suﬃciently compensate X giving Y preferential access to its own
market. At the same time, Z cannot be too big since this would cause X’s lack
of preferential access to Z under the Y Z-CU to be too costly. Second, it is
easily shown by subtraction that X is better oﬀ as a CU-outsider than under
free trade when dx > 1150
1083 (dy + dz); country X must be so big that gains from
protection with Nash tariﬀs exceed the combined eﬃciency gains of free trade
and the losses from lack of preferential access under the PTA.
3.2. The core
From the trade agreement-welfare mapping, policy makers determine how
a speciﬁc agreement aﬀects them. They then maximize welfare by choosing a
trade agreement under the constraint that any partners must also accept the
agreement for it to be possible. For tractability, I subsequently assume that X
and Y are identical in all respects: dx = dy = d.
The trade agreements under consideration are the eight possibilities listed
in Table 1. Formally, the trade agreement γ (γ ∈ (1,2,...,8)) is in the core iﬀ
it is unblocked, where γ is blocked iﬀ there exists a coalition β which yields a
consumption S = {ξx,qx,ξy,qy,ξz,qz} | β such that Ui(S) ≥ Ui(Tγ) ∀ i ∈ β
with at least one strict inequality.23 While the utility of two- and three country
coalitions are well deﬁned because the resulting trade agreements are unique,
the utility of single country coalitions depends on what the remaining two
countries do. I assume that they do what is most likely, namely optimize their
welfare given the constraint that the third country will not cooperate. Because
of the symmetry between X and Y , I will not encounter the problem that
one of the remaining countries prefers one agreement while the other prefers
something else.
All countries have preferences over trade agreements given d,dz. These are
determined by comparing the welfare obtained for a country under diﬀerent
22Syropoulos (1999) also ﬁnds that the formation of a CU may not beneﬁt the rest of the
world even if the CET of the CU falls.
23This paper follows Riezman (1985) and Macho-Stadler et al (1998) in their use of core
theory in that I do not require the blocking coalition to be better oﬀ on its own compared
to under the blocked agreement: countries belonging to the blocking coalition do trade with
countries not in the coalition.
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agreements, using the results from the previous subsection. For country X:
Table 2. Preferences over trade agreements.
1
14d > dz : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T8 ≻ T7 ≻ T3 ≻ T6
37
110d > dz > 1
14d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T8 ≻ T1 ≻ T7 ≻ T3 ≻ T6
21 007
46 500d > dz > 37
110d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7 ≻ T3 ≻ T6
1629
3500d > dz > 21 007
46 500d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T3 ≻ T7 ≻ T6
21
40d > dz > 1629
3500d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T3 ≻ T6 ≻ T7
1890
3239d > dz > 21
40d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T7
70
117d > dz > 1890
3239d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T6 ≻ T1 ≻ T3 ≻ T7
425
686d > dz > 70
117d : T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
625
798d > dz > 425
686d : T5 ≻ T8 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
4827
6100d > dz > 625
798d : T8 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
87
100d > dz > 4827
6100d : T8 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T6 ≻ T4 ≻ T3 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
143511
158711d > dz > 87
100d : T8 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
d > dz > 143 511
158 711d : T8 ≻ T5 ≻ T6 ≻ T2 ≻ T3 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
7469
6669d > dz > d : T8 ≻ T6 ≻ T5 ≻ T3 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
14037
10750d > dz > 7469
6669d : T8 ≻ T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
30
17d > dz > 14 037
10 750d : T6 ≻ T8 ≻ T3 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
511
250d > dz > 30
17d : T6 ≻ T8 ≻ T3 ≻ T5 ≻ T4 ≻ T2 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
2510
969 d > dz > 511
250d : T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T8 ≻ T5 ≻ T4 ≻ T2 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
dz > 2510
969 d : T6 ≻ T3 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
To understand these rankings, consider for instance agreement 6, the CU be-
tween X and Z. In the beginning of the table, demand is very low in Z
compared to X and Y , and so a CU with Z is the worst outcome for X: X
looses tariﬀ revenue from Z and has to open its market but gets only preferen-
tial access to a very small country in return. However, as one moves down the
table, the relative demand in Z increases, and it becomes much more desirable
for X to have an XZ-CU. In fact for dz > 14 037
10 750d, this is X’s best option as
it simultaneously gives the country preferential access to a large market (as
opposed to the Nash or any trade agreement with Y ) and lets it collect tariﬀs
from Y (as opposed to free trade). Of course, the opposite holds for country Z,
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and so this CU cannot necessarily be optimal for X and Z at the same time. In
fact, when both X and Y are large compared to Z, it is optimal for Z to have
free trade as this secures free access to two large markets where the XZ-CU
would only give preferential access to one. Thus, Z never prefers an XZ-CU
over all other alternatives. However, as we will see below, this CU still belongs
to the core under certain conditions.
Free trade starts out in the middle of the ranking in Table 2, and becomes
increasingly desired as countries get closer in size. It is the preferred outcome
when countries are fairly similar, but then decreases in desirability as prefer-
ential access to Z becomes more proﬁtable in terms of welfare. All other trade
agreements move up and/or down the preference scale of country X for similar
reasons. Country Y ’s ranking of the alternatives is symmetric to the one of X,
and a similar, though not symmetric, ranking can be constructed for country
Z.
The trade agreements in the core can now be determined by simply com-
paring the rankings of all countries and see which agreements are unblocked.
Before stating the actual result, it is worthwhile to consider some special cases
to understand the outcome. For 625
798d > dz, the XY -CU is preferred by both
X and Y and will therefore block any other trade agreement, irrespective of
the fact that this is the worst possible allocation for Z. Thus, in a world with
two large countries and one small, one would expect the two large countries to




10750d > dz > 625
798d
￿
, free trade is preferred by everyone and is therefore
the only agreement in the core.
When dz increases further compared to d, agreements in the core are not
necessarily the preferred outcome for all members of the agreement. Consider
the interval 121 889
92 610 d > dz > 14037
10750d, for which preferences are given by:
X: T6 ≻ T8 ≻ T3 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 ≻ T1 ≻ T7
Y : T7 ≻ T8 ≻ T4 ≻ T5 ≻ T2 ≻ T3 ≻ T1 ≻ T6
Z: T8 ≻ T7 = T6 ≻ T2 ≻ T4 = T3 ≻ T1 ≻ T5
(19)
where T7 = T6 and T4 = T3 for Z follows from the symmetry of X and Y .
Clearly the Nash, the XY -FTA, the XY -CU, and the XZ- and Y Z-FTAs are
all blocked by free trade. Both X and Y would like to make a CU with Z, and
even if Z prefers free trade to this, it cannot block it as not all members of the
free trade coalition would obtain as much welfare as under the CU. Similarly
for free trade: it is preferred by Z, and neither X nor Y alone or together can
block this. Thus, the core contains both the XZ- and Y Z-CUs and free trade.
For all remaining values of relative demand, the core is found in a similar
manner. This results in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Given demand d,dz, the trade agreements most likely to result
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(i.e. the agreements in the core) are:
For 625
798d > dz : XY -CU
For 14 037
10 750d > dz > 625
798d : Free trade
For 3761
1890d > dz > 14037
10750d : Free trade, XZ-CU, Y Z-CU
For 2300
1083d > dz > 3761
1890d : Free trade
For dz > 2300
1083d : XY -CU
This result is interesting for several reasons. First of all, the solution concept
sharpens predictions from the eight possible trade agreements in Table 1 to
just four outcomes. Furthermore, the core is non-empty so that it is possible to
make a prediction for any relative demand, and the prediction will be precise
unless dealing with two small and one slightly larger country. Interestingly,
the model predicts that a cooperative agreement will be reached irrespective
of relative demand.
It is seen that eﬃciency gains from free trade unambiguously outweigh the
preferential eﬀects of a PTA when countries are rather similar. This is in
contrast to Riezman (1985) who in an example shows that all possible (2-
country) CUs can be in the core when countries are symmetric.
In the third case in Proposition 5, the fact that XZ-, Y Z-CUs are possible
outcomes even when free trade is actually preferred by Z shows that even
large countries can lose compared to free trade by voluntarily entering a CU
agreement. It also shows that a country can lose compared to a CU by entering
a free trade agreement just as voluntarily.24 These observations lead to the
following Proposition:
Proposition 6. In the static game, it is possible for a country to lose compared
to free trade by voluntarily entering a CU. Furthermore, countries may lose
compared to a CU by voluntarily agreeing to free trade.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 6 is strengthened by observing that even if the
XY -CU is the predicted outcome both for very small and very large relative
demand, the reasons for the two predictions are very diﬀerent. In particular,
when markets in X,Y are very small compared to Z, Z prefers to act alone no
matter what X and Y do (cf. Proposition 4). Due to Z’s lack of cooperation,
X and Y are forced to settle with a CU between them even if it is only their
4th-5th best option. As in Riezman (1985) example 1, the small countries do
not gain from the CU compared to free trade, but rather choose the CU as a
best response to a country that gains from a tariﬀ war. Also, in this setting,
large countries will never support free trade unless suﬃciently compensated to
24Given any of the three outcomes, countries act voluntarily in the sense that they cannot
force a diﬀerent agreement which makes them better oﬀ.
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do so by the small country(ies). On the other hand, when relative demand in
Z is very small, X and Y are not interested in sharing their markets with Z.
Instead, they form an XY -CU to have mutual access to X,Y markets while
still being able to collect tariﬀ revenue from Z.
It is striking that the core contains no FTAs at all. The analytical argument
for this is that for two countries to rank an FTA over a CU, demands must be
so diﬀerent that the large country involved will either be better oﬀ on its own
(in Z’s case) or in a CU with a country of equal size (in X’s case). In practice,
the creation of an FTA can also undermine the individual countries’ bargaining
power, and the administrative cost of rules of origin is very high.
However, this immediately raises the question of why most PTAs in the
world are then FTAs and not CUs? One explanation is political. For instance,
the facts that negotiations for an FTA can be easier than those for a CU because
CETs need not be agreed upon and that FTAs provide greater ﬂexibility in
trade policy against the rest of the world are not captured by this model.25
Furthermore, it is possible that (as with the Andean Community) FTAs are
only a ﬁrst step towards deeper integration, and that many FTAs will turn into
CUs over time.
4. The dynamic game
In the static game, trade agreements are predicted to be coalition formations
in the core. The dynamic game builds on a similar intuition, but goes further in
that it restricts the trade agreements available to countries to those that are
in fact sustainable against deviation (to be deﬁned).
By imposing this requirement, the section makes the model more realistic in
two ways: countries have the opportunity to cheat, and the game is modelled
over several periods. As the example in the introduction shows, an incentive to
cooperate does not always equal the ability to do so. Thus, one should model
endogenously formed agreements as self-sustaining.
I show below that none of the solutions in the core are robust to deviation
when only one period is considered. In fact, of all options available to countries
in Table 1, only the Nash is robust because it is non-cooperative to begin
with. The subsequent inclusion of more periods imposes a cost on cheating
which in some circumstances is suﬃcient to restore bilateral and/or multilateral
cooperation. Furthermore, some results from the static case do carry over to
the dynamic framework provided countries are patient.
4.1. Sustainability
In the present paper, sustainability is deﬁned in a standard repeated game
framework by invoking the Folk Theorem: an agreement is sustainable iﬀ the
25The latter could be included in the model by allowing a to diﬀer between countries in
the analysis of the core.
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welfare obtained by adhering to the agreement exceeds that obtainable by de-
viating in one period and then being punished by moving to an alternative
continuation equilibrium that yields a lower average payoﬀ than the original
agreement. Countries can only deviate individually, and I assume that when
they do, their punishment consists of return to the Nash forever. While this
particular punishment strategy is chosen for tractability, it should be noted that
there are many diﬀerent alternatives which may sustain diﬀerent outcomes.
With this deﬁnition of punishment, any agreement which yields at least as
much welfare as the Nash for all members can be sustained provided countries
are suﬃciently patient. This subsection determines exactly how patient coun-
tries need to be for a given trade agreement to be sustainable given relative
demand. The selection between sustainable equilibria is discussed in the next
subsection.
To formally deﬁne sustainability, it must ﬁrst be deﬁned how a deviation
takes place, who is able to deviate, and what they gain from doing so. To devi-
ate, a country agrees to some coalition as usual in the ﬁrst stage of the coalition
formation game. But when it comes to setting tariﬀs in the second stage, the
country sets Nash tariﬀs instead of the tariﬀs it would set if maximizing utility
subject to the constraints of the trade agreement (remember that the optimal
tariﬀs of a country not bound by any agreement are the Nash tariﬀs always).
Tariﬀs are set simultaneously, so the other countries cannot react to the devia-
tion in the period in which it occurs: they set their tariﬀs according to the stage
one agreement. The latter is what deﬁnes the diﬀerence between a deviation
and a single country blocking since blocking is only possible if welfare increases
for the blocking country once outsider countries have adjusted their tariﬀs.26
Any country can deviate from an agreement, but if a non-member does so
it has no eﬀect on member cooperation (for the outsider, deviation and compli-
ance is the same thing since Nash tariﬀs are played in both cases). Deviation by
a member causes that member to gain because at least one binding constraint
is removed from its maximization problem while everything else (that is, the
tariﬀs of the other countries) is kept constant. The deviation gain is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between the welfare obtained by deviation and that obtained by














x is country X’s welfare when deviating from γ, and the numbers/γ
in the parentheses stand for the trade agreement according to which that tariﬀ
is set.
It can thus already be observed that no trade agreements (except the non-
cooperative one) is robust to such deviation in a one period game. Therefore,
one would expect to observe Nash behavior only. Naturally, this is not the case,
26One may think of a single country blocking as taking place in the ﬁrst stage where trade
agreements are formed so that all other countries adjust their tariﬀs optimally, whereas a
deviation comes as a surprise in the tariﬀ setting stage so that the other countries cannot
react.
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and subsequent periods must be included in the analysis. I do so by assuming
that countries play trigger strategies such that a defection will be punished
by playing Nash tariﬀs forever.27 This punishment is credible because Nash
tariﬀs are indeed optimal in the non-cooperative game. When this threat is
large enough to inﬂuence current behaviour towards cooperation, the trade
agreement is sustainable:































where δ is the discount factor which is assumed common for all countries
(δ ∈ [0,1)), W
γ
i is the welfare obtained by country i under trade agreement
γ, and i ∈ γ iﬀ i is a member of γ. The ﬁrst line shows that an agreement is
sustainable iﬀ the welfare in the deviation period plus the discounted welfare
in all punishment periods is less than the discounted welfare in the trade agree-
ment. The second line compares the gains and losses relative to the welfare
obtained under γ: γ is sustainable if and only if the deviation gain is no greater
than the discounted punishment loss.
By insertion of the relevant tariﬀs into the welfare function and solution
of the above inequalities, I obtain the requirement for sustainability for all
possible agreements. (See Table 3.)
First of all, for any country to be willing to participate in a cooperative trade
agreement, it must be the case that the welfare obtained by that country under
the cooperative agreement exceeds that achievable under the Nash. If not, the
deviating country would not only gain in the deviation period, but also in
all subsequent “punishment” periods and would therefore deﬁnitely deviate.
This is what gives rise to the requirements on demand in Table 3.28 Trade
agreements 2 and 5 do not contain such requirements because X and Y are
symmetric, and the welfare from a CU or FTA between symmetric countries
always dominates that obtainable in the Nash. The symmetry between X and
Y is also what causes the sustainability requirements for agreements 3-4 and
6-7 to be identical.
Given the restrictions on demand are satisﬁed, the deviating country will
gain in the deviation period and lose in every punishment period compared
to staying in the original agreement. Whether deviation pays or not therefore
comes to depend on the deviating country’s degree of patience, which is mea-
sured by δ. As always, sustainable cooperation is increasing in this parameter.
27It is easily shown that the trigger strategy is optimal when other players play the same
strategy, see Gibbons (1992).
28Equivalently, δ ≥ 1 must hold outside these intervals for an agreement to be sustainable.
This is impossible since δ ∈ [0,1).
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Table 3. Requirement for sustainability.
Agreement sustainable provided
T1 − −
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All threshold values for δ depend on the relative demand in member coun-
tries only, since this is what determines the relative sizes of gains and losses con-
nected with the agreement. In particular, demand in the non-member country
is irrelevant because members’ sales in this country are the same under compli-
ance with the agreement, deviation from it, and Nash punishment. Thus, all
expressions containing non-member demand cancel from the second line in De-
ﬁnition (7) above. It follows that the threshold of δ is independent of demand
when member countries are symmetric.
To have an overview of how relative demand otherwise aﬀects the threshold





while the vertical axis measures delta (δ ∈ [0,1)). FTAs between
asymmetric countries are sustainable above the line EIF, CUs above the line
DJG, and free trade sustainable above AKH. An FTA between symmetric coun-
tries is sustainable above BL, and a CU sustainable above CM. It is clear that
PTAs are more diﬃcult to achieve when partners are asymmetric, because both
members’ incentive to deviate must be taken into account: asymmetry causes
one partner to have a greater interest in the agreement (because access to a
larger market is gained), while the other partner is less interested. Because the
most strict condition is determinant for the overall requirement for sustainabil-
ity, this causes an increase in the threshold on δ. Furthermore, the threshold
is increasing in the degree of asymmetry. The same result holds for free trade
sustainability.
The reason why CUs are easier to sustain than FTAs is that the punishment
loss is greater (at least for the relevant values of relative demand). This again
follows from the internalization of eﬀects on the partner’s welfare in a CU when
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Figure 2. The dependence of sustainability on relative demand.
setting the CET. The gain in the deviation period also increases, though not
enough to outweigh the eﬀect of increased punishment. Free trade is even easier
to sustain than a CU, again because an increased punishment loss outweighs
the eﬀect of an increase in the deviation gain.
4.2. The game
The dynamic game consists of inﬁnitely many periods with one tariﬀ-setting
stage in each period. Before the game starts, there is a stage “0” where coun-
tries coordinate to a certain equilibrium according to the core, where the core
is the outcome of a hypothetical initial bargaining process where blockings and
counterblockings are also hypothetical. That is, the core is used as an equilib-
rium selection criterion which ﬁnds the most likely outcome of the bargaining
process among all sustainable trade agreements.
The outcome of all previous periods is observed by all countries before the
current period, and countries play the previously described trigger strategy. I
assume complete information so that each country knows whether it would pay
for its partners to deviate. Because subsequent optimal behaviour is taken into
account at stage “0”, this means that an unsustainable trade agreement will
never be made to begin with. Thus, the trade agreement signed in stage “0”
will continue to hold forever in this setup.
In practice, the game is solved as follows: for all possible combinations
of relative demand and delta, I determine which agreements are sustainable,
and use these agreements only as available possibilities in a hypothetical static
game, which is solved as the static game above by ﬁnding the agreements in
the core. In this way, I determine the agreements most likely to form out of all
sustainable agreements.
The results are shown graphically in Figure 3B and algebraically in the
appendix. Figure 3A shows the trade agreements in the core of the static game
for comparison. As in ﬁgure two, the axes measure relative demand and delta
respectively.
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A. Solution to the static game
B. Solution to the dynamic game
Figure 3
There are seen to be big diﬀerences in the two solutions. Most obviously,
Figure 3B contains a large area where the solution is non-cooperative because
one (or more) country(ies) is (are) too impatient to maintain any cooperative
trade agreement: the short term gain of a deviation is preferred to the inﬁnite
stream of gains from cooperation. The fact that cooperation is reduced mainly
for low discount factors can be problematic for real world cooperation since
governments sit for a short period only, and therefore often have low discount
factors.29
The interval of relative demands for which an XY -CU can be the solution
has increased. This expansion, however, comes at the expense of a reduction
in the area for which free trade can be a solution, and occurs because Z will
ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from free trade even if its relative demand is smaller
than before. There are two reasons for this, and which is applicable depends
very much on the size of relative demand.
29Dixit (1987).




15, Z is better oﬀ under free trade than in the Nash, but for
some values of relative demand not more so than that it pays for Z to deviate
should a free trade agreement form. X and Y realize this and choose their best
possible sustainable option, the XY -CU. When 2300
1083 > dz
d > 28
15, the reason has
no longer much to do with sustainability, but rather comes from the assumption
about how deviation is punished and the fact that for Z, the Nash is preferred
to free trade which again is preferred to any CU for this interval of relative
demand. While in the static case, Z would not block free trade because the
resulting XY -CU would make it worse oﬀ, the possibility of a deviation not
only allows Z to collect a gain in the deviation period, but also to gain from
being in the Nash instead of in free trade in all subsequent periods. Thus,
Z will deﬁnitely deviate and free trade becomes infeasible. Again, X and Y
choose their best feasible option, the XY -CU.
The comparison of Figures 3A and B gives rise to a central Proposition of
this paper:
Proposition 8. The introduction of the self-sustainability requirement reduces
the overall scope for cooperative trade agreements. Free trade is among the
most likely outcomes for less values of relative demand while preferential trade
agreements are among the most likely outcomes for more values of relative
demand. This is true even when countries are very patient (i.e. δ almost equal
to one).
Proposition 8 gives a more negative view on the scope for cooperation
compared to the static solution. There is, however, also good news. Most
importantly, it has been shown that for the values of relative demand and im-
patience at which free trade or a PTA is the solution in the dynamic setting,
there exists at least one strategy that can support these as equilibrium out-
comes when both deviations and blockings are allowed for. Furthermore, when
28
15d > dz > 14 037
10 750d, the sustainability requirement makes free trade the most
likely outcome for some values of δ whereas the core of the static game contained
both free trade, XZ-CUs, and Y Z-CUs. Thus, the requirement facilitates mul-
tilateral cooperation in this case. Interestingly, for 3239
1890d > dz > 14 037
10 750d, im-
patience can cause free trade to be the outcome of the dynamic game, where
more patience may yield a PTA instead
￿
since for δ ≥ 1890
3239
dz
d , there are three
possible solutions, but for 1890
3239
dz
d > δ ≥ 15
28
dz
d free trade is the only solution
￿
.
The conclusion that FTAs are not among the most likely equilibria for any
value of relative demand continues to hold. So do the facts that it is possible
for a country to lose compared to free trade by voluntarily entering a CU as
well as lose compared to a CU by voluntarily agreeing to free trade.
While these results are interesting in their own right, they also raise some
questions. In particular, I have not allowed for diﬀerent punishment strategies
or for the non-deviating countries to cooperate during the punishment phases.
The implementation of the latter would, for instance, be expected to alter the
conclusion that Z will deviate from free trade when 2300
1083 > dz
d > 28
15 (at least for
some δs). Dixit [1987] calls the fact that other outcomes may be sustained by
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diﬀerent strategies a non-uniqueness in addition to the one that several diﬀerent
trade agreements may be sustainable by the same strategy. In these terms, the
equilibrium selection criteria of this paper solves the latter non-uniqueness (at
least for most values of δ and relative demand), but not the former.
4.3. Stepping stone or stumbling block?
The question of whether regional integration will keep economies on the
track towards free trade or instead allow regions to turn so powerful that coop-
eration between them becomes impossible has been a main concern since the
beginning of the 1990’s when PTAs started to mushroom. Since most models
ﬁnd free trade desirable, the concern is real and has the worst case scenario of
three strong trading blocks (the FTAA, the EU and an Asian block) ﬁghting
each other instead of cooperating towards a more eﬃcient outcome.30
With a slight abuse of the dynamics inherent in the stepping stone/ stum-
bling block idea, the question can be answered in the current model. Thus, I
say that a PTA is a stumbling block iﬀ a PTA is the expected outcome in the
previous dynamic game, while free trade would result absent the possibility of
regional cooperation. Also, a PTA is a stepping stone when free trade remains
the solution to the dynamic game even if countries are free to form PTAs. With
these deﬁnitions, the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 9. Whether a CU can be a stepping stone or a stumbling block
to free trade in the dynamic game depends on the relative demand between
countries as well as the degree of impatience.
A recalculation of the dynamic solution when PTAs are not allowed for
shows that PTAs can be stumbling blocks to free trade. For instance, this is
the case when 625
798d > dz > 1
14d and δ ≥ 15
14
d
dz+d. Here, relative demand in X
and Y is so big that they prefer an XY -CU to free trade; the increased access
to Z’s market following full trade liberalization would not generate suﬃcient
welfare gains for X and Y to cover the losses they would suﬀer from giving up
their preferential access under the CU. But absent the opportunity of forming
such CU, X and Y would be better oﬀ granting Z access to their markets than
by playing the Nash, and free trade would result.
On the other hand, a CU can be a stepping stone when d > dz > 625
798d,
since free trade is in the core no matter whether PTAs can be formed freely or
not in this case. This conﬁrms that a PTA can be a stepping stone towards
free trade under the unanimous regionalism rule of Yi (1996).31
Letting the deﬁnition of stepping stone and stumbling block in the static
game be as for the dynamic game, only with “dynamic” exchanged for “static”,
CUs can be both stepping stones and stumbling blocks in the static game as
well. For instance, the XY -CU is a stumbling block when 625
798d > dz > 1
14d
30Krugman (1991) ﬁnds that world welfare is minimized at three trading blocks.
31Yi ﬁnds that a PTA can be both a stepping stone and a stumbling block under this rule,
but that the latter is typical.
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 9 (1): 61–94, junio de 2006M. E. B. NIELSEN 89
and a stepping stone when 14037
10750d > dz > 625
798d for reasons similar to those of
the dynamic case.
4.4. The symmetric case and multilateral tariﬀs
Because one eﬀect of GATT has been to reduce tariﬀs multilaterally, this
section considers the addition of a multilateral tariﬀ to the set of possible co-
operation choices. Thus, countries have the options of free trading, being in
the Nash, making a preferential agreement, and reducing tariﬀs multilaterally.
For tractability, I shall assume that all countries are symmetric. I will brieﬂy
review previous results for the symmetric case before proceeding to the intro-
duction of the multilateral tariﬀ and the demonstration of how it can improve
welfare.
Under symmetry, the model simpliﬁes greatly in that all members of an
agreement have the same incentive to stay in or deviate from the trade agree-





d, W FTA =
2199
4900
d, W CU =
869
1900










This allows me to rank welfare unambiguously as
W F > WCU > WFTA > WI,
implying that the eﬃciency of free trade outweighs the redistributional gains
of a PTA irrespective of country size and production costs. Thus, under the
core solution concept, one should never observe anything but free trade.
If allowing for deviation, it is known from Table 3 and the fact that d = dz
under the symmetry assumption that free trade is only sustainable provided
δ ≥ 15
28. Sustainability of a CU and FTA requires δ ≥ 1890
3239 and δ ≥ 70
117
respectively. Since free trade is easiest to sustain and yields the most welfare,
it will be the outcome whenever δ exceeds 15
28. If δ is below this threshold, the
Nash results.
Now, a multilateral tariﬀ is simply a tariﬀ that is common for all countries.
By insertion of this common tariﬀ, t, into the welfare function, and letting W M




(3(a − c) − 2t)(5(a − c) + 2t)
b
.








a − c + 2t
b
< 0,
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implying that eﬃciency gains cause free trade to be preferred to an above zero
common tariﬀ always
￿





. This is so because
countries are symmetric; the increase in domestic proﬁts and tariﬀ revenues
due to rent shifting are never suﬃciently large to outweigh the negative eﬀects
on consumers surplus and proﬁts from abroad in this case. Thus, one will still
expect to observe free trade only under the core solution concept.
Turning to the dynamic case, it is clear from the welfare comparison that
free trade will be chosen whenever it is sustainable. But as it turns out, a
multilateral tariﬀ reduction can improve the welfare of all countries when free
trade is not sustainable. To see this, consider ﬁrst the requirement for sustain-
ability of the multilateral tariﬀ
￿
letting W DM
x denote the welfare of country X













which, provided the common external tariﬀ is below that of the Nash ￿
t < 3





3(a − c) − 10t
7(a − c) − 10t
≤ δ (22)
This lower bound on delta is below that of free trade whenever t > 0. Thus, a
multilateral tariﬀ can be sustainable even when free trade is not. By comparing
welfare at the Nash and an arbitrary common tariﬀ, it is easily established that
the multilateral tariﬀ is preferred to the Nash provided t < 3
10 (a − c). Because
welfare is decreasing in the common tariﬀ, countries can maximize welfare by




7(a−c)−10t. Any higher tariﬀ reduces welfare, and any lower tariﬀ causes
deviation and return to the Nash.
5. Concluding remarks
Though the literature on (preferential) trade agreements has developed
in the direction of stability issues and endogenous trade agreement formation,
there still seems to be a presumption that at least some (part of an) agreement
is binding or exogenously speciﬁed.
In a three-country oligopolistic trade model, this paper predicts which trade
agreements form when choices of countries are endogenous. In particular, the
resulting agreement must be self-enforcing, and no other sustainable agreement
(among the possibilities listed in Table 1) in which all members achieve at
least as much (with one achieving strictly more) welfare as under the chosen
agreement must be able to form. The solution method shows how the core can
be used as an equilibrium selection tool to determine the agreement most likely
to form among all sustainable agreements.
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When countries enter a cooperative trade agreement, they gain from the
enhanced access to partner market(s) and increased competition at home, but
also suﬀer losses due to the decrease in tariﬀ revenue and domestic monopoly
power. The relative size of these eﬀects, and thus the desirability of the trade
agreement, is determined by relative demand. In general, the greater the part-
ner market(s), the more is gained, and the greater the domestic market, the
more is lost. Sustainability is deﬁned in a standard repeated game framework.
I ﬁnd that the introduction of the self-enforcement requirement reduces the
overall scope for cooperative trade agreements; allowing for deviation alone
makes agreements other than the Nash impossible, and though the introduc-
tion of more periods makes cooperation attainable in some cases, the total
eﬀect is negative. In the static coalition formation game, only CUs and free
trade are among the predicted outcomes with the latter belonging to the core
only when countries are fairly similar. In the dynamic case, the Nash is the
predicted outcome irrespective of relative demand whenever countries are im-
patient. Furthermore, free trade is among the most likely outcomes for less
values of relative demand while preferential trade agreements are among the
most likely outcomes for more values of relative demand.
Some results from the static game are robust to the inclusion of the sustain-
ability restriction. Most importantly, with or without the constraint, FTAs are
never among the predicted outcomes, and it is possible for a country to lose
compared to free trade by voluntarily entering a CU as well as to lose com-
pared to a CU by voluntarily agreeing to free trade. Also, CUs can be both
stumbling blocks and stepping stones to free trade in both cases. A sustainable
multilateral tariﬀ agreement between symmetric countries can improve welfare
only in the dynamic case and only when free trade itself is not sustainable.
The model is one of intraindustry trade between three countries only, and
one should therefore interpret its speciﬁc predictions with caution. However,
the main point of the paper, namely that self-sustainability is important in
both preferential and multilateral cooperation and that the inclusion of this
constraint matters, seems more robust. In particular, one would expect that
the introduction of a self-sustainability requirement for all trade agreements in
other models (for instance those mentioned previously) would generally cause
a change in the pattern of cooperation otherwise found, with all cooperation
breaking down for some degree of impatience. The example of the Andean
Community shows how cooperation may be optimal, yet not achievable unless
all members are ready to give up short term gains.
While the paper provides a framework for predicting trade agreement out-
comes which are both stable and sustainable, several extensions remain. Most
importantly the introduction of more cooperative agreements in the game (es-
pecially to allow for multilateral tariﬀ cooperation which has already been
shown to be the solution to the dynamic game in some cases), consideration of
diﬀerent punishment strategies (dynamic punishment and/or punishment mod-
elled according to WTO rules), and a further development of the dynamics in
the model. Additional asymmetry is also desirable, particularly in either the
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demand parameter a or the cost parameters c. Such extension would cause a
new asymmetry in tariﬀs, which for instance would allow countries to beneﬁt
from the ﬂexibility in external tariﬀ setting under an FTA. Moving beyond the
current model, the inclusion of trade speciﬁc capital which builds up during
PTA membership could cause history to become determinant of the pattern of
PTAs as the cost of deviation rises.
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Appendix: the solution of the dynamic game
Table 4. Algebraic solution for the dynamic game
Requirement on d,dz Requirement on δ Trade agreement
625





3239 > δ T1
1475




dz+d > δ ≥ 1890
3239 T5
d > dz > 625








dz+d > δ T1
14 037





3239d > dz > d 15
28
dz





d > δ ≥ 1890
3239 T5
28









1890d > dz > 14 037






3239 > δ T1
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